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Abstract
Consider the Rational Expectations price history of an Arrow-Debreu security that ma-
tures in the money: p
1
; p
2
; :::; p
T
. Past information can be used to predict the return
(p
t+1
  p
t
)=p
t
. Now consider a simple alternative performance measure: (p
t+1
  p
t
)=p
t+1
.
It diers from the return only in that the future price is used as basis. This variable
cannot be forecasted from past information. The result obtains even if investors' beliefs
are biased, i.e., prices are not set in a Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE). It de-
pends only on investors' using the rules of conditional probability to process information.
More precisely, the result continues to hold in the Bayesian Equilibrium with Consistent
Beliefs (CBE) introduced by Harsanyi [1967]. Many related results are proved in this
paper and extensions to the pricing of equity subject to bankruptcy risk are discussed.
JEL Classication : C22, D84, G14.
Keywords: Arrow-Debreu Securities, Rational Expectations Equilibrium, Bayesian Equi-
librium, Consistent Beliefs, Market Eciency, Learning, Martingales, Reverse Time, Sur-
vivorship Bias.
Martingale Restrictions
On Equilibrium Prices of Arrow-Debreu Securities
Under Rational Expectations And Consistent Beliefs

Peter Bossaerts
1 Introduction
This paper studies the time series behavior of security returns when a crucial cash ow
determinant remains constant over time. This determinant has to be interpreted in a
wide sense: it could be a company's bankruptcy status at a certain future date; whether
a natural resources rm will obtain long-term monopoly rights for the exploitation of an
oil eld at some time in the future; whether an electronics rm will have its technology
accepted as unique nationwide standard by the government. More abstractly, the cash
ow determinant is best described as a state variable uniquely describing the path of a
security's payouts in the future. This state variable could simply be a real number xed
at the outset, or an innite-dimensional vector whose entries specify the realizations over
time of a latent variable generating the cash ows.
Investors do not know the value of the state variable, but gather information as time
passes by. Prices will be set in a Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE). This means
that investors use Bayes' rule to process information. If certain agents fail to observe
pieces of information that others see, they learn from the equilibrium price. In accordance
with standard denitions of REE, investors' inference will be assumed to be based on
correct beliefs. This implies, among other things, that their predictions are unbiased in
cross-section (Muth [1961], Radner [1967], Lucas [1972], Green [1973]).
The results of the paper, however, will not depend on Rational Expectations. In-
vestors may have beliefs that deviate substantially from the laws that Nature uses to
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determine the value of the state variable in a particular history. Their inference, how-
ever, must continue to be rational, i.e., it must be based on Bayes' rule. Investors' beliefs
may even dier, but, these dierences must actually be made inconsequential by assum-
ing that they satisfy Harsanyi's consistent prior restriction (Harsanyi [1967]). This rules
out investors' agreeing to disagree (Aumann [1976]) and the corresponding diculty of
having to deal with speculation (Harrison and Kreps [1978], Tirole [1982]). The exten-
sion of REE to arbitrary but consistent beliefs will be referred to as Consistent Beliefs
Equilibrium (CBE).
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The canonical form of an asset whose payo depends on a state variable that is xed
in a given time series is the Arrow-Debreu security. Consequently, the paper will focus
on this rather abstract yet powerful security. As is standard in Arrow-Debreu securities
analysis, the time horizon is taken to be nite. The discount rate can therefore be taken
to be zero. The extension to an innite horizon would force one to leave the elegant
world of Arrow-Debreu securities. Also, in order to focus on asset return characteristics
induced by the updating of beliefs about the unknown state variable, investors will be
assumed to be risk neutral.
In this paper's world, securities analysis would be simple if one had a cross-section
of independent realizations. One could exploit the unbiasedness property of the REE or
readily estimate the initial common prior in the CBE. The paper starts from the premise
that the analyst either has only a single price series at her disposal or is reluctant to
embark on a cross-sectional analysis by lack of identifying information such as cross-
sectional independence or exchangeability. In other words, the paper initially focuses on
the type of analysis that is predominant in asset pricing, namely time series analysis.
Nevertheless, the ndings are also of importance for the analysis of cross-sections of
independent price histories, because it allows one to readily distinguish rational learning
from biases in beliefs without having to estimate priors. In other words, it provides a test
of the validity of REE within the larger class of CBE. To underscore this point, results
from a study of data from the Iowa experimental markets will briey be discussed.
From the perspective of the marginal investor setting prices, i.e., using her information
and beliefs, securities price changes, and, hence, returns, ought not to be predictable.
Samuelson [1965] was one of the rst to point out this martingale property in the context
of a REE. It holds in a CBE as well, because it is based entirely on the rationality of the
updating rule.
Samuelson's martingale result has often been interpreted as implying that returns in
a time series ought to be unpredictable. In investments analysis, this property is usually
referred to as market eciency. The time series mean return should be zero on average
(under the assumption of risk neutrality and zero discount rates), and projections of
returns onto past information should reveal insignicant slope coecients.
1
See Biais and Bossaerts [1995] for an explicit comparison of REE, CBE and Bayesian Equilibrium
under Inconsistent Beliefs (speculative equilibrium) in a nancial markets setting.
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It does not take much imagination to see that market eciency will not follow in the
world of this paper. The distribution that generates a particular return series diers from
the one used by the marginal investor to set prices. Under the latter, returns cannot be
forecasted. In contrast, predictability will generally be observed under the former. In
particular, Arrow-Debreu securities that eventually pay o will feature price series that
trend upward; those that mature out of the money may exhibit negative returns on
average.
The import of the paper would be minor if its only contribution were to advance
this obvious point.
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Instead, the main purpose is to present martingale results for payo-
related quantities that obtain under the distribution underlying time series analysis. The
martingale restrictions do not obtain for traditionally computed returns (except for one
involving the investigation of series in reverse time). The paper will mainly use a modied
return measure, where the price change is divided by the future price instead of the lagged
price.
The martingale restrictions obtain under REE and CBE alike. The latter is attractive:
REE have recently been criticized for being irrealistic because investors' beliefs must be
unbiased from the outset. Temporary, and, certainly, permanent biases are not allowed.
The former are likely to occur. But even the latter cannot be ruled out, as Kurz [1994]
argues. The CBE retain only the most important feature of REE, namely Rational
Learning. In this sense, it is comforting to know that this paper's martingale restrictions
on returns and modied returns are robust to a generalization of REE to CBE.
The paper also discusses extensions to the pricing of equity subject to bankruptcy risk.
The martingale restrictions on modied returns become weaker. Their behavior, however,
continues to be sharply distinguishable from that of the traditional return measure. This
allows the empiricist to test the rationality of equity pricing even if bankruptcy leads to
otherwise dicult statistical problems, namely survivorship bias and sample truncation.
Empirical tests of asset pricing models have invariably been based on REE instead of
CBE, perhaps because of a widespread fear that the results would otherwise depend all
too delicately on the specication of priors (a criticism often raised against Bayesian anal-
ysis). This paper's contribution is to show that there are aspects of asset price data that
are invariant across beliefs structures. These ought to form the focus of future empirical
research in nance. Only after one fails to observe the martingale restrictions derived
in this paper, can one safely question the rationality of pricing in nancial markets.
This contrasts with many empiricists' unfortunate tendency of immediately regarding
any deviation from REE as evidence of irrational or boundedly rational behavior (e.g.,
De Bondt and Thaler [1985]).
2
Discussions of the problem abound in the empirical nance literature, mostly in terms of an envi-
ronment where the underlying xed parameter determines eventual survival of the asset. The empiricist
is warned for the consequences of observing complete price series only for assets that have survived. See
Brown, Goetzmann and Ross [1995] for a discussion of how survivorship bias could explain several asset
pricing anomalies.
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The remainder is organized as follows. The next section formally describes the prob-
lem that the paper addresses. Section 3 presents the results under REE. A simple,
nite-state example is discussed in Section 4 (some readers may nd that they under-
stand the issues more readily by rst looking at this example). Section 5 proves that
the same restrictions hold when extending the notion of equilibrium from REE to CBE.
Section 6 provides illustrations. Section 7 discusses extensions to the price behavior of
equity subject to bankruptcy risk. The relevance of the results of the paper for cross-
sectional analysis is treated and illustrated with experimental market data in Section 8.
Section 9 lists some open questions. Section 10 concludes.
2 Formal Problem Statement
Let time be indexed t = 1; 2; 3; :::; T + 1. The possible states of the world are listed in a
sample space 
. We shall consider assets with a payo V at T+1. V is a random variable
dened on 
. (At this point, we are not yet restricting our attention to Arrow-Debreu
securities, so we remain aspecic about V .) The ow of information to the market will
be represented by a ltration fF
t
g
T+1
t=1
.
3
V 2 F
T+1
. The probability measure P governs
(
; fF
t
g
T+1
t=1
).
Let p
t
denote the equilibrium price at t. p
t
2 F
t
. Under REE, and subject to risk
neutrality and zero discounting (restrictions that will be kept throughout the paper),
p
t
= E[V jF
t
]:
This implies the following fundamental result, originally derived in Samuelson [1965].
Let r
t+1
denote the return over the period t; t+ 1:
r
t+1
=
p
t+1
  p
t
p
t
: (1)
Lemma 1 Under REE,
E[r
t+1
jF
t
] = 0:
(All proofs are collected in the Appendix.)
Lemma 1 has generally been interpreted as implying that there must not be any
predictability in time series of asset returns, a property that is usually referred to as
market eciency (Fama [1970]). Historical averages of returns ought to be zero (except
for sampling error); projections of a history of returns onto lagged information ought to
produce insignicant coecients.
3
If individual agents' information diers, F
t
is to be interpreted as the information reected in the
equilibrium price.
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In many cases, however, absence of predictability does not follow from Lemma 1. One
case is focused on here, namely where 
 can be factored into a parameter set  and a
remainder
~

:

 = 
~

: (2)
Elements of  are denoted ; those of
~

 are denoted ~!. Nature picks a  2  at the outset.
It determines the information ow fF
t
g
T
t=1
as well as the nal payo V (V is a nontrivial
function of ). Nevertheless,  62 F
t
, all t  T . In other words, signals are never fully
revealing. As will be demonstrated in Section 4, however, the theoretical results continue
to hold even if signals may fully reveal the state  prior to T + 1. This full-revelation
case nevertheless does lead to serious theoretical-statistical problems. Fortunately, the
practical relevance of those problems will often be limited, as the simulations in Section 6
and 7 illustrate.
The example that we are going to use throughout is that of an Arrow-Debreu security
that pays one dollar if  is revealed at T to be . In that case,
V (; ~!) = 1
f=g
(1
fg
denotes the indicator function). In addition to p
1
; :::; p
t
, F
t
could include a history
of signals s
1
; :::; s
t
(a signal is a function of  and ~!). Since the signals reveal information
about , the equilibrium price p
t
(= E[V jF
t
]) will progressively reect more about .
The return r
t+1
will reect the updating between time t and t+ 1.
In this situation, it will still be true that
E[r
t+1
jF
t
] = 0
(Lemma 1). The actual behavior of the signals, the equilibrium prices, and, hence, the
return series fr
t+1
g
T 1
t=1
, however, will be determined by the value of  picked by Nature
at the outset. More formally: signals, prices and returns are draws from the conditional
probability measure P

. Despite the fact that E[r
t+1
jF
t
] = 0 (Lemma 1), E[r
t+1
jF
t
_ ]
diers from zero (except in trivial cases), and, hence,
E[
1
T   1
T 1
X
t=1
r
t+1
j]
= E[
1
T   1
T 1
X
t=1
(r
t+1
  E[r
t+1
jF
t
_ ])j]
+ E[
1
T   1
T 1
X
t=1
E[r
t+1
jF
t
_ ]j]:
The rst term in the last expression is zero; the second term generally is not.
4
In fact, it is not dicult to prove rigorously the following.
4
One exception is when T is large and beliefs converge, which implies that E[r
t+1
jF
t
_ ] !
E[r
t+1
jF
t
] = 0. The Cesaro sum in the second term will then converge in P to zero.
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Lemma 2 Let fF
t
g
T
t=1
be the information ltration generated by prices and (condition-
ally) independent signals s
1
; s
2
; :::; s
T
. Under REE,
E[r
t+1
jF
t
_ ] > 0;
where r
t+1
denotes the return over the period t; t + 1 on an Arrow-Debreu security that
pays one dollar when  = .
In words: the return on Arrow-Debreu securities that eventually pay o one dollar is
positive on average.
The implications of the foregoing are straightforward: historical average returns on
Arrow-Debreu securities will predominantly be found to be signicantly dierent from
zero. Likewise, projections of return histories on past information will often exhibit
signicant coecients. Substantial evidence against \market eciency" will be found.
Yet price setting follows the rigour of REE; Lemma 1 is not violated.
We shall refer to the conditional measure P

as the empirically relevant measure. It
is the one that governs the behavior of signals, prices and returns in a particular history.
Hence, it is the one that the empiricist will be able to estimate. To put it dierently:
P

determines the behavior of the statistics that the empiricist computes from historical
data.
The problem that this paper addresses can now be stated formally. In the above situ-
ation, time series analysis of asset returns will reveal violations of martingale restrictions.
Are there payo-related variables for which martingale behavior would obtain under the
empirically relevant measure? A payo-related variable is one that can easily be com-
puted from prices and that measures somehow the payos on the asset. We shall use
the notation x
t+1
to denote any payo-related variable measured using prices observed
at time t and t+1. What we are asking is really: for which payo-relevant variables can
we state that:
E[x
t+1
jF
t
_ ] = 0? (3)
Clearly, the traditional return measure, r
t+1
(see Eqn. (1)), is not a candidate. If we can
nd an armative answer for a particular payo-related variable, the time series analyst
could focus on it and verify that it cannot be predicted, conrming REE.
3 Empirically Relevant Martingale Restrictions Un-
der REE
We shall maintain the assumption throughout that the ltration fF
t
g
T
t=1
is generated
by prices and a sequence of (conditionally) independent signals s
1
; :::; s
T
. Most of the
results to be discussed continue to hold when the signals are dependent over time. For
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the time being, we should refrain from relaxing the independence assumption, in order
not to distract. Later on, we shall come back to the issue of independence.
Given this assumption, Lemma 2 obtains. It states that returns tend to be positive.
The question one should ask is whether there exists a simple correction to the calculation
of returns that cancels the positive drift. Returns are traditionally computed by dividing
an asset's payo by its price at the beginning of the period (see Eqn. (1)). Would the
drift be canceled if we were instead to divide the asset's payo by its end-of-period price?
The resulting payo-relevant variable, to be denoted x
+
t+1
, would be dened as follows:
x
+
t+1
=
p
t+1
  p
t
p
t+1
: (4)
Because of Lemma 2, the end-of-period price tends to be higher than the beginning-of-
period price. Using the former as basis to compute returns may oset the bias.
Surprisingly, this works.
Theorem 3 Let fF
t
g
T
t=1
be the information ltration generated by the prices p
1
; :::; p
T
as well as (conditionally) independent signals s
1
; :::; s
T
. Under REE,
E[x
+
t+1
jF
t
_ ] = 0;
where x
+
t+1
is computed as in Eqn. (4), using prices of an Arrow-Debreu security that
pays one dollar when  = .
In words: returns on the Arrow-Debreu securities that eventually pay o one dollar will
be a martingale dierence sequence, provided they are computed using the end-of-period
price as basis.
The proof relies on arguments that have been used to show that likelihood ratio
sequences are martingale processes (see, e.g., Doob [1953], II.7 and VII.9). Likelihood
functions appear here because prices change as the result of an information accumulation
process that can be written explicitly in terms of likelihood functions and a prior (Bayes'
rule). Likelihood functions in particular play a crucial role in the determination of the
properties of the equilibrium price processes. It turns out that the second determinant,
the prior, is irrelevant, a property that we will exploit to show that Theorem 3 continues
to hold when the scope of equilibrium is extended from REE to CBE (where agents'
priors do not necessarily coincide with the law according to which Nature draws ). The
arguments of this extension are, however, subtle. Since the proof of Theorem 3 is really
simple, we therefore plan to formally discuss it in the next section. This will provide
the right background against which the subtleties of the extension to CBE will be best
understood.
Theorem 3 restricts the behavior of a payo-related variable for the Arrow-Debreu se-
curities that will mature \in the money." These securities are often the survivors, because
usually only they generate complete price records. One can then interpret Lemma 2 as
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providing an expression for the survivorship bias, whereas Theorem 3 suggests a correc-
tion. Many have pointed out the existence and nature of survivorship biases in securities
price data (most recently, Brown, Goetzman and Ross [1995]), but no correction has
been advanced yet that does not rely on a cross-section that either is not available or is
contaminated by strong dependence. Therefore, Theorem 3 provides the rst foundation
of a formal analysis of securities price data under survivorship bias. We shall come back
to this point in Section 7.
Can we say something about payo-related variables for the other Arrow-Debreu
securities? Can one obtain martingale results for Arrow-Debreu securities that eventually
mature \out of the money"? Fortunately, the answer is armative. Moreover, it does
not involve complicated payo-related variables. In contrast, it relies on the traditional
return measure (Eqn. (1)). What is novel, however, is that it requires an analysis of
return series in reverse time. Returns will constitute a martingale dierence sequence
in reverse time only, which means that verication entails a projection of returns onto
future information. Unfortunately, the result obtains only for binary parameter spaces.
Let  = f; g. Introduce an index n which increases backward in time. n =
1; 2; :::; T . It is related to the index forward in time, hence, we can write: n(t). Set:
n(t) = T   t+1. A sequence of prices in reverse time starts with the value of the security
at maturity (p
T
) and ends with the price at t = 1. E.g., the fth price in the reverse-time
sequence is the (T   4)th price in the original sequence.
The return in period (n  1; n) in reverse time, x
 
n
, will be dened as the traditional
return r
t+1
with t = T   n + 1:
x
 
n
=
p
T n+2
  p
T n+1
p
T n+1
= r
T n+2
: (5)
Since we are analyzing price and return series in reverse time, we cannot use the
original information ltration fF
t
g
T
t=1
, which accumulates forward in time. The analysis
of time series in reverse requires that one accumulate information backward in time. Let
us introduce the ltration fF
 
n
g
T
n=1
. We take F
 
n
to be generated by the signals observed
at t = T; :::; T  n+2 (when n > 1), and the prices observed at t = T; :::; T  n+1.
5
The
probability measure governing (
; fF
 
n
g
T
n=1
) continues to be P . As before, P

denotes
the measure corresponding to conditioning on . It is the empirically relevant measure
used to compute expectations, such as E[x
 
n
j].
We obtain the following attractive theorem.
Theorem 4 Let fF
 
n
g
T
n=1
be the information ltration generated by (conditionally) in-
dependent signals as well as market prices observed prior to n in reverse time. Let  be
5
The signal observed at T   n+ 1 is not included in F
 
n
. If it were, the empiricist would be able to
infer p
T n
, using Bayes' law. Yet, p
T n
is not observed till point n + 1 in reverse time. See the proof
of Theorem 4 for details.
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binary, namely,  = f; g. Under REE,
E[x
 
n
jF
 
n 1
_ ] = 0;
where x
 
n
is the traditional return over the period n 1; n, computed as in Eqn. (5), using
prices of an Arrow-Debreu security that pays one dollar when  = .
Notice the simplicity of this result: when the parameter space is binary, returns on Arrow-
Debreu securities that eventually mature \out of the money" are not predictable from
future information. Forward in time, returns on these securities are predictable (although
the analogue to Lemma 2 does not obtain - we discuss this point next). Backward in
time, however, the empiricist cannot predict.
Using the law of iterated expectations, we can condition out F
 
n 1
in Theorem 4 and
we obtain the following.
Corollary 5 Under the conditions of Theorem 4,
E[r
t
j] = 0;
where r
t
is the traditional return over the period (t 1; t), computed as in Eqn. (1), using
prices of an Arrow-Debreu security that pays one dollar when  = .
In words: the unconditional expected return on the Arrow-Debreu security that matures
\out of the money" is zero. This remarkable result implies that there is no a priori drift
to the price of this security (when expressed as percentage price change). It contrasts
with Lemma 2, which stated that the price of the Arrow-Debreu security that matures
\in the money" does display a positive drift. In analogy to this Lemma, one would have
expected the drift in the price of the Arrow-Debreu security that matures with a zero
payo to be negative. Such is not the case.
The binary parameter space may appear overly restrictive until it is realized that the
payo on many nancial securities can be written as a function of a binary unknown state.
The most important example is equity: at a xed date in the future, the rm is either
bankrupt or not; if it is, equity pays zero; if not, equity pays a (random) positive amount.
The Arrow-Debreu security is simpler to analyze, because it pays a xed amount (one
dollar) in the second state. Hence, it is the ideal primitive security with which to study
time series analysis under bankruptcy potential. In this sense, Theorem 4 provides the
necessary foundation for the formal analysis of the history of prices of equity in bankrupt
rms.
To complete the analysis of returns in REE, we consider the behavior of x
 
n
in reverse
time for the Arrow-Debreu security that matures \in the money." The following result
is proved in the Appendix.
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Theorem 6 Let fF
 
n
g
T
n=1
be the information ltration generated by (conditionally) in-
dependent signals as well as market prices observed prior to n in reverse time. Let  be
binary, namely,  = f; g. Under REE,
E[x
 
n
jF
 
n 1
_ ] > 0;
where x
 
n
is the traditional return over the period n 1; n, computed as in Eqn. (5), using
prices of an Arrow-Debreu security that pays one dollar when  = .
This result is complementary to that in Lemma 2. The latter predicted a positive average
return on the Arrow-Debreu security whose payo is nonzero at maturity. According to
Theorem 6, the empiricist would forecast a positive return in reverse time as well. Unlike
Lemma 2, however, it requires a binary parameter space.
4 A Simple, Finite{State Example
Let us briey discuss an explicit example. Besides illustrating the main results, it facil-
itates the discussion of the extension to the case of a potentially fully revealing signal
prior to T + 1, as well as the theoretical-statistical problems it would create.
Let  be binary:  = f; g. Let T = 3. Consider the price p
t
(t = 1; 2; 3) of a
security that pays $1 if  = , $0 otherwise. At t = 1, agents are agnostic about the state
of the world, i.e., F
1
= f;
g. At t = 2, they receive a signal, s
2
, as follows. If  = 
then:
s
2
=
(
1 with probability 1/2;
0 with probability 1/2;
if  =  then:
s
2
=
(
1 with probability 1/3;
0 with probability 2/3:
This constitutes F
2
. Later on, we will discuss F
3
.
Setting Pf = g = 1=4, we obtain:
p
1
=
1
4
:
Letting l
2
(s
2
j) denote the conditional likelihood of s
2
, Bayes' rule implies that if s
2
= 1:
p
2
=
l
2
(s
2
= 1j)p
1
l
2
(s
2
= 1j)p
1
+ l
2
(s
2
= 1j)(1  p
1
)
=
1
2
1
4
1
2
1
4
+
1
3
3
4
=
1
3
:
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Analogously, if s
2
= 0:
p
2
=
l
2
(s
2
= 0j)p
1
l
2
(s
2
= 0j)p
1
+ l
2
(s
2
= 0j)(1  p
1
)
=
1
2
1
4
1
2
1
4
+
2
3
3
4
=
1
5
:
Consequently:
E[p
2
jF
1
_ ] =
1
3
1
2
+
1
5
1
2
=
4
15
>
1
4
= p
1
;
i.e.,
E[r
2
jF
1
_ ] > 0: (6)
This is the content of Lemma 2. In contrast,
E[
1
p
2
jF
1
_ ] = 3
1
2
+ 5
1
2
= 4
=
1
p
1
;
i.e.,
E[x
+
2
jF
1
_ ] = 0; (7)
conrming Theorem 3.
Let us now investigate the eect of potential full revelation by studying the following
information ow at t = 3, conditional on s
2
= 1 (i.e., p
2
= 1=3). If  =  then:
s
3
= 1 with probability 1;
if  =  then:
s
3
=
(
1 with probability 1/2;
0 with probability 1/2:
This constitutes the information in F
3
when s
2
= 1. Letting l
3
(s
3
j) denote the condi-
tional likelihood of s
3
, and appealing to Bayes' law, we obtain that, if s
3
= 1,
p
3
=
l
3
(s
3
= 1j)p
2
l
3
(s
3
= 1j)p
2
+ l
3
(s
3
= 1j)(1  p
2
)
=
1
1
3
1
1
3
+
1
2
2
3
=
1
2
:
11
Analogously, if s
3
= 0:
p
3
=
l
3
(s
3
= 0j)p
2
l
3
(s
3
= 0j)p
2
+ l
3
(s
3
= 0j)(1  p
2
)
=
0
0 +
1
2
2
3
= 0:
Consequently:
E[p
3
jfs
2
= 1g _ ] =
1
2
1 + 0:0
=
1
2
>
1
3
= p
2
;
i.e.,
E[r
3
jfs
2
= 1g _ ] > 0: (8)
Again, this is the content of Lemma 2. Now, however, we have:
E[
1
p
3
jfs
2
= 1g _ ] = 2:1 +
1
0
0
= ?
i.e., E[x
+
3
jfs
2
= 1g _ ] is indeterminate. The full revelation of the state when s
3
= 0
complicates matters.
To obtain the result of Theorem 3, one can use the following limit argument. Consider
a sequence of economies, indexed n = 1; 2; 3; :::. In the nth economy,
Pfs
3
= 1jfs
2
= 1g _ g = 1 
1
n
:
As n!1, we obtain the economy described above. In the nth economy, if s
3
= 1:
p
3
=
(1 
1
n
)
1
3
(1 
1
n
)
1
3
+
1
2
2
3
=
1 
1
n
2 
1
n
;
and if s
3
= 0:
p
3
=
1
n
1
3
1
n
1
3
+
1
2
2
3
=
1
n
1 +
1
n
:
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Hence,
lim
n!1
E[
1
p
3
jfs
2
= 1g _ ]
= lim
n!1
 
2 
1
n
1 
1
n
(1 
1
n
) +
1 +
1
n
1
n
1
n
!
= lim
n!1

2 
1
n
+ 1 +
1
n

= 3:
Consequently,
lim
n!1
E[x
+
3
jfs
2
= 1g _ ] = 0; (9)
extending the validity of Theorem 3.
While Theorem 3 is not necessarily invalidated when signals are potentially fully
revealing, such a case does create dicult statistical problems. Heuristically, this can be
explained as follows. When  = , one never observes price paths with p
3
= 0, which
means that x
+
3
will always be nite. As a matter of fact, with unit probability, one
observes that x
+
3
= 1  (1=3)=(1=2) = 1=3 > 0.
Mathematically, the statistical problems are created by the nonexistence of moments
of order higher than one. Take, for instance, the second moment:
lim
n!1
E[
 
1
p
3
!
2
jfs
2
= 1g _ ]
= lim
n!1
0
@
 
2 
1
n
1 
1
n
!
2
(1 
1
n
) +
 
1 +
1
n
1
n
!
2
1
n
1
A
= lim
n!1
 
(2 
1
n
)
2
1 
1
n
+
(1 +
1
n
)
2
1
n
!
:
The latter limit does not exist.
In fact, the above is a nice example of how unbiasedness is a weak statistical property.
While the (time series) sample average is unbiased, it will generate almost always (i.e.,
with unit probability) a value that is higher than the theoretical mean. In other words,
the sample average is inconsistent. This is no surprise given the nonexistence of higher
moments.
In the above example, the problem introduced by full revelation before or at T is
severe. This is because the probability of full revelation is high. In cases where the
probability of full revelation at any point in time is low, statistics such as the sample
average are much better estimates of their population counterparts. The illustration in
Section 6 is an example.
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5 Extension To Consistent Beliefs Equilibria (CBE)
The results in Section 3 have all been derived under the assumption that securities prices
are set in a REE. To see why they continue to be valid when we extend the scope of
equilibrium to include those where agents have more general (but still consistent) beliefs,
we need to analyze the updating rule (Bayes' rule) in a formal way and use the result to
express the various conditional expectations in terms of (Lebesgue-Stieltjes) integrals.
Continuing with the assumption of Lemma 2, we assume that agents receive a se-
quence of (conditionally) independent signals s
1
; s
2
; :::; s
T
. Priors about  are updated
with these signals. The updating is rational, i.e., Bayes' rule is used. The equilibrium
price reects Rational Expectations, which means that the prior is derived from the ac-
tual probability measure that generates the outcomes, P . Factor P into an unconditional
 dened on  and a conditional P

dened on
~

.  represents the law Nature uses to
draw  from . Under Rational Expectations, the prior of the agents is given by .
Let l
t
(s
t
j) denote the density of s
t
corresponding to P

. Agents' beliefs about  can
be written as a sequence of probability measures over , f
t
g
T
t=0
, whose elements are
recursively dened by:

0
(d) = (d); (10)
and

t
(d) =
l
t
(s
t
j)
t 1
(d)
R

l
t
(s
t
j)
t 1
(d)
(11)
when t = 1; :::; T .
Hence, the time-(t + 1) price of the Arrow-Debreu security that pays one dollar if
 = , equals:
p
t+1
= E[V jF
t+1
]
= E[1
f=g
jF
t+1
]
= 
t+1
(d)
=
Z

1
f=g

t+1
(d)
=
Z

1
f=g
l
t+1
(s
t+1
j)
R

l
t+1
(s
t+1
j)
t
(d)

t
(d)
=
l
t+1
(s
t+1
j)
t
(d)
R

l
t+1
(s
t+1
j)
t
(d)
: (12)
Now that we have expressed prices in terms of integrals, we are ready to prove The-
orem 3. As mentioned in the previous section, the proof is simple enough to be included
here. It enables us, however, to illustrate the apparent irrelevance of the prior, at the
same time pointing out some subtle arguments needed to extend the results of Section 3
to CBE.
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Consider p
t
=p
t+1
:
p
t
p
t+1
=

t
(d)

t
(d)
R

l
t+1
(s
t+1
j)
t
(d)
l
t+1
(s
t+1
j)
=
R

l
t+1
(s
t+1
j)
t
(d)
l
t+1
(s
t+1
j)
: (13)
For the empiricist, the relevant expectations condition on F
t
and . These conditional
expectations can be computed by integrating with respect to the conditional density
l
t+1
(s
t+1
j). If we apply this to (13), l
t+1
(s
t+1
j) will cancel against the denominator
of (13). We are left with the density of s
t+1
conditional on s
1
; :::; s
t
, which integrates out
to 1.
To show this formally, let S
t+1
denote the sampling space of s
t+1
.
6
Let P
s
1
;:::;s
t
denote
the probability of s
t+1
conditional on the history s
1
; :::; s
t
. We have:
E[
p
t
p
t+1
jF
t
_ ] =
Z
S
t+1
R

l
t+1
(s
t+1
j)
t
(d)
l
t+1
(s
t+1
j)
P

(ds
t+1
) (14)
=
Z
S
t+1
R

l
t+1
(s
t+1
j)
t
(d)
l
t+1
(s
t+1
j)
l
t+1
(s
t+1
j)ds
t+1
(15)
=
Z
S
t+1
Z

l
t+1
(s
t+1
j)
t
(d)ds
t+1
=
Z
S
t+1
P
s
1
;:::;s
t
(ds
t+1
) (16)
= 1:
Noting that
x
+
t+1
=
p
t+1
  p
t
p
t+1
= 1 
p
t
p
t+1
;
Theorem 3 obtains immediately.
This proof reveals an important fact: the nature of the priors is irrelevant. In the
above, P
s
1
;:::;s
t
is obtained from P . Any other P

s
1
;:::;s
t
would do, as long as it emerges
from a measure P

on 
 which can be factored into an arbitrary prior 
0
on  and P

on
~

 (the same P

that emerges from a factorization of P into  and P

). In all cases,
the crucial equality
Z
S
t+1
P

s
1
;:::;s
t
(ds
t+1
) = 1 (17)
would hold (see Eqn. (16)).
Whereas the priors are not crucial, the updating rule in Eqn. (11) is. Without it,
the cancelations in (13) and (15) would not have obtained. Consequently, Rational
Learning is crucial; Rational Expectations is not. Theorem 3 continues to hold when
6
We shall implicitly assume that S
t+1
is some real (sub)space. l
t
(s
t+1
j) is taken to be the density
of P

with respect to the Lebesgue measure. It is trivial to extend the analysis to more general cases.
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agents have priors that deviate from the \correct" one. The resulting equilibrium will not
be REE anymore, but will share with it the rationality of updating. This is essentially the
Bayesian Equilibrium with Consistent Beliefs developed in the game-theoretic literature
by Harsanyi [1967]. We refer to it as the Consistent Beliefs Equilibrium (CBE).
Actually, we are not done yet. There is a subtle complication which needs to be
addressed before the arguments of the proof of Theorem 3 continue to be valid under
CBE. It concerns the nature of 
0
(subsequent beliefs, i.e., 
t
for t > 0, can be obtained
from 
0
and the signals, so need not be considered separately). In the world of REE,

0
is xed, being obtained from factorization of the actual probability measure P . In
particular, 
0
= . In the world of CBE, however, 
0
will generally be a random variable
for the empiricist. Indeed, because priors are arbitrary, it would be unrealistic to assume
that she knows agents' priors in any given history.
Therefore, the sampling space ought to be extended to include the space of all prob-
ability measures over , to be denoted (). The resulting sampling space 
 equals

~

 (). The information ltration can be as before. Let Q denote the extension
of P to the new 
 (and the ltration generated by the signals and prices). Because agents'
beliefs at t, 
t
, are not in F
t
, they ought to be integrated out in the the right-hand-side
of (14) using Q.
Factor Q into a probability measure  on  and another one, Q

, on
~

  (). As
before, the signals are mutually (conditionally) independent. We now add to this that
they be perceived to be (conditionally) independent of the prior 
0
. Altogether, this
implies that Q

(ds
t+1
d
0
) = Q

(ds
t+1
)Q

(d
0
). Using this, we can adapt Eqns. (14) {
(16) to the case of CBE.
E[
p
t
p
t+1
jF
t
_ ] =
Z
()
Z
S
t+1
R

l
t+1
(s
t+1
j)
t
(d)
l
t+1
(s
t+1
j)
Q

(ds
t+1
)Q

(d
0
)
=
Z
()
Z
S
t+1
R

l
t+1
(s
t+1
j)
t
(d)
l
t+1
(s
t+1
j)
l
t+1
(s
t+1
j)ds
t+1
Q

(d
0
)
=
Z
()
Z
S
t+1
Z

l
t+1
(s
t+1
j)
t
(d)ds
t+1
Q

(d
0
)
=
Z
()
Z
S
t+1
P

s
1
;:::;s
t
(ds
t+1
)Q

(d
0
)
=
Z
()
Q

(d
0
)
= 1:
Noting again that x
+
t+1
= 1  p
t
=p
t+1
, we have shown the following.
Theorem 7 Let fF
t
g
T
t=1
be the information ltration generated by the prices p
1
; :::; p
T
as well as (conditionally) independent signals s
1
; :::; s
T
. Under CBE,
E[x
+
t+1
jF
t
_ ] = 0;
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where x
+
t+1
is computed as in Eqn. (4), using prices of an Arrow-Debreu security that
pays one dollar when  = .
The importance of this result must be underscored. It implies a simple test of the
rationality of learning in nancial markets: verify whether x
+
for \surviving" Arrow-
Debreu securities forms a martingale dierence sequence. Rational Expectations are not
required. Market prices may reect biased priors. Information, however, must be ab-
sorbed into prices in a rational way, i.e., conform with the rules of conditional probability
(Bayes' rule).
The remaining propositions of the previous section continue to hold under CBE as
well. We collect them in the following theorem.
Theorem 8 Theorems 4 and 6, as well as Corollary 5, continue to hold if REE is relaxed
to CBE.
What is accomplished? Several payo-related variables continue to exhibit martingale
dierence characteristics even in the world of Arrow-Debreu securities and even if prices
are not set according to Rational Expectations, but in accordance with arbitrary, poten-
tially biased, beliefs. The crucial determinant of the martingale results is not beliefs, but
rationality of learning.
6 Illustration
We now turn to a simple simulation exercise. It is meant to illustrate Theorems 3
and 7. In contrast with the theoretical model of the previous section, the signals will
not be (conditionally) independent. As mentioned there, Theorem 3 is unaected by a
relaxation of this assumption. The analysis of returns in reverse time (e.g., Theorem 4),
however, is invalidated. We will discuss why, and use the simulations to illustrate the
violations.
The example is inspired by the analysis in Brown, Goetzmann and Ross [1995]. It
deviates from the preceding theoretical analysis in that the signals may perfectly reveal
the true state before maturity (remember that we have been assuming that  62 F
t
, all
t  T ). As argued in Section 4, the results continue to hold for a potentially perfectly
revealing signal. The theoretical properties of statistics constructed on the basis of the
simulations, however, become hard to analyze. Nevertheless, the example is included
here because of its prominence in the literature. Further simulations revealed that the
conclusions remain qualitatively the same if we had chosen a non-perfectly revealing case.
The Model: The signals s
t
are taken to be the increments of a Brownian motion
with volatility . The initial value of the Brownian motion is known and equal to W
0
.
The signals are really pieces of the sample path of a Brownian motion (functions of time).
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Most often, we need only the value at the end. So, s
t
will usually refer to this endpoint
value. The value of the Brownian motion at t, W
t
, can then be obtained as:
W
t
= W
0
+
t
X
=1
s

:
We dene a barrier B, with W
0
> B. B is known.  is binary, with  =  for those
sample paths of the Brownian motion such thatW
t
> B for all t 2 [0; T

], where T

> T .
Otherwise,  = .
We consider the prices of the Arrow-Debreu security that pays $1 if  = . For
W
t
> B, standard analysis of rst-passage-time of Brownian motions reveals that:
p
t
= E[1
f=g
jF
t
]
= 2N(
W
t
 B

p
T

  t
)  1; (18)
where N denotes the standard normal distribution function (see, e.g., Karatzas and
Shreve [1987], p. 80).
Figure 1: We set B = 0 and consider the price paths for which  = .  = 0:40,
W
0
= 1, T = 200 and T

= 1000. Figure 1 displays a typical sample path. The upward
drift in prices is not very apparent in this gure, but becomes clear when aggregating
the results from a large number of simulations. This is done in the subsequent gures.
Figure 2: Figure 2 displays the empirical density of the (time series) average return,
1
199
199
X
t=1
r
t+1
;
across 200 simulations. Plotted are: (i) the histogram, (ii) a kernel estimate of the density
using a normal kernel, (ii) the normal density evaluated at the sample mean and standard
deviation of the outcomes. The upward bias is striking. As a matter of fact, the mean is
several standard errors above zero. The mean equals 0.0194; its standard error 0.0006.
Figure 3: In contrast, Figure 3 displays the empirical density of the (time series)
average x
+
, i.e.,
1
199
199
X
t=1
x
+
t+1
:
According to Theorem 3, this payo-related variable should be unbiased. Figure 3 con-
rms that it is. Again the histogram, a kernel estimate of the density and the normal
density evaluated at the sample mean and standard deviation are plotted. The mean is
within one standard error from zero: it equals 0.0005, whereas its standard error equals
0.0006. (The skewness is reected in the fact that the median is well above the mean: it
equals 0.0034.)
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Figures 4 and 5: Theorem 3 not only claims that the average x
+
would be unbiased,
but also that x
+
cannot be predicted from past information. To verify this, we project
x
+
t+1
onto the beginning-of-period price level, p
t
. This is a time series projection, i.e.,
the data run from t = 1 to t = T   1 (T = 50). (There is a reason why this particular
projection was chosen; it will be discussed later.) Figures 4 and 5 display the empirical
densities (histogram, kernel estimate and normal density) for the OLS intercept and slope
coecient, respectively.
The gures illustrate Theorem 3: both the intercept and slope coecient have densi-
ties that are concentrated around zero. Since x
+
t+1
is regressed on an endogenous variable
(p
t
), neither the OLS intercept estimator nor the OLS slope estimator will be unbiased.
Indeed, in both cases, the mean of the estimates is more than two standard errors away
from zero.
7
Nevertheless, the densities have substantial mass both below and above zero.
The intercept estimates are anywhere between -0.3253 and 0.1483; the slope estimates
are between -0.6428 and 0.6665.
Figures 6 and 7: Contrast this with the empirical densities of the intercept and
slope coecient in a time series OLS projection of the return, r
t+1
, onto the beginning-
of-period price, p
t
. Figures 6 and 7 display the result. The estimates of the intercept
are always positive: they are between 0.0329 and 0.3598. Those of the slope are always
negative: between -1.4995 and -0.501. The explanation for the negative slope coecient
is simple: if initial signals convey that the security is going to expire worthless, the price
quickly drops to a very low level; since the security eventually does mature in the money,
prices are very likely to increase subsequently; conversely, if positive signals reach the
market early on, prices gradually increase to a high level; subsequent signals most often
only conrm this price runup, hence, returns are more likely to be low. In other words:
returns are negatively correlated with the price level.
The choice of projection can now be justied. It has been documented that the
returns on common stock are indeed inversely related to the price level. Among the
rst to notice this were Keim and Stambaugh [1986]. It reappears, disguised, in the
success of contrarian strategies (e.g., Jegadeesh [1990]), and, in the long run, in the
(albeit controversial) literature on long-run mean reversion in stock prices (De Bondt
and Thaler [1985]). There has been some theoretical work trying to explain this in a
dynamic, stationary asset pricing framework (Bossaerts and Green [1989], Berk [1995]).
Recently, it has been suggested that bankruptcy may explain some of the phenomenon
(Brown, Goetzmann and Ross [1995]). The results in Figures 6 and 7 support this view.
As mentioned before, Arrow-Debreu securities reect the essence of bankruptcy: there is
a state () where the security pays zero { this is the bankruptcy state; in the other state
(), the security pays one dollar { this is the no-bankruptcy state.
Figure 8: Throughout this example, signals are increments of a Brownian motion.
Hence, they are independent. Unfortunately, they are not independent conditional on .
7
When increasing T to 500 and T

to 5000, the biases disappeared: the mean estimates of the
intercept and slope became insignicant.
19
Given , for instance, the distribution of s
t
depends on the accumulation of past signals,
i.e., W
t 1
.
8
The theorems in the previous sections all assume conditional independence.
It was pointed out that the results concerning forward time series analysis continue to
hold if the signals are dependent, but that the reverse-time martingale dierence behavior
would not obtain.
It is easy to see why. Section 5 revealed that the theorems rely on a cancelation of
two density functions: (i) the density used by the market to evaluate the likelihood of
observing a signal conditional on a given , and (ii) the density used by the outsider to
evaluate the likelihood of the same signal. Forward in time, the two densities always
coincide if conditioned on the same . In reverse time, however, the two densities may
not coincide even if conditioned on the same . If the signals are dependent over time,
the market will use lagged signals as additional conditioning information to assess the
likelihood of the next signal. This means that the density it uses will depend not only
on , but also on lagged signals. When analyzing return data in reverse time, however,
the empiricist cannot condition on these signals, because they do not occur prior (in
reverse time) to the return. In fact, the empiricist evaluates the likelihood of a signal
by incorporating signals that occur in the future when dated forward in time. Hence,
the density she uses diers from that used by the market, and the cancelations that
were so crucial to the theorems will not obtain. There is only one exception: the signals
are (conditionally) independent. In that case, neither the market nor the empiricist
conditions on lagged (forward or backward in time) signals. Hence, the likelihoods of
signal outcomes coincide and the cancelations can be carried out.
There is another source of dependence in the simulations.
9
Forward in time, all price
paths start at the conditional probability of a nonzero payo given W
0
= 1. One thereby
introduces a selection bias in reverse time: after 200 periods, all price paths revert back
to the same level. Hence, returns will not be independent.
To illustrate how lack of independence invalidates the theorems involving return anal-
ysis in reverse time, Figure 8 plots the densities (histogram, kernel estimate and normal
curve) of the returns on the Arrow-Debreu security that pays one dollar in the alternative
state, i.e., . Returns are computed conditional on the true state being . According to
Corollary 5
10
, the time series average return should be zero. Figure 8 illustrates that this
is not the case. In fact, its mean is several standard errors below zero: it equals -0.0032;
its standard error is 0.0001.
REE vs. CBE: In the simulations used to produce the gures, Nature (the com-
puter) always set  = . In other words, Nature did not obtain the signals from the
8
See Brown, Goetzmann and Ross [1995] for an extensive analysis.
9
Oleg Bondarenko quite rightly pointed this out.
10
Corollary 5 is stated in terms of the Arrow-Debreu security that pays one dollar if  =  and the
returns are observed when the true state is . Its validity obviously is unaected by a reversal of the
roles of  and .
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solutions to the following stochastic dierential equation:
dW
t
= dZ
t
; (19)
where dZ
t
denote the instantaneous increments of a Wiener process. Instead, the signals
were generated by:
dW
t
=
2n(
W
t

p
T

 t
)
p
T

  t(2N(
W
t

p
T

 t
)  1)
dt+ dZ
t
: (20)
(n denotes the standard normal density.) The solutions to the stochastic dierential
equation in (20) provide sample paths that do not cross the barrier B = 0 before T

.
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Investors did use Eqn. (19) to update their beliefs about . It diers from the process
truely used by Nature, Eqn. (20). Consequently, investors did not make decisions on the
basis of Rational Expectations. Nevertheless, their learning was rational. The simulations
therefore illustrate Theorems 7 and 8 instead of the Theorems of Section 3. They conrm
that the results of this paper do not depend on REE. Instead, all what is required is the
Rational Learning of a CBE.
7 Equity
One wonders how the martingale characterizations would apply to assets other than
Arrow-Debreu securities. Of course, any asset can be considered to be a portfolio of such
securities, but, since the martingale restrictions concern only specic Arrow-Debreu secu-
rities, they will generally not obtain for arbitrary portfolios of these primitive securities.
It is straightforward, however, to extend the results to assets whose payo conditional
on the xed parameter () is independent of the signals. As before, let V denote the
security's (random) payo at maturity (T ) and g(V j) its density conditional on  = .
Assume that the security's payo is zero for all other values of . It now suces to
substitute
R
V g(V j)dV 1
f=g
for 1
f=g
and the proofs continue to hold.
As far as the analysis forward in time is concerned, it is even possible to obtain clean
results for the case where V depends on the sequence of signals as well. This would
mean that the conditional density, g, is a function of past signals, in addition to . The
following is proved in the Appendix.
Theorem 9 Let fF
t
g
T
t=1
be the information ltration generated by the prices p
1
; :::; p
T
as well as (conditionally) independent signals s
1
; :::; s
T
. Under CBE,
E[x
+
t+1
jF
t
_ ]  0;
11
See, e.g., Brown, Goetzmann and Ross [1995]. Actually, the simulations were based on Euler dis-
cretization of (19), whereby (t; t + 1) was split in ten subintervals of equal length; subsequently, the
sample paths for which the (discretized) Brownian motion crossed the barrier were discarded.
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where x
+
t+1
is computed as in Eqn. (4), using prices of a security that pays a random
amount V when  =  and zero otherwise; V and the signals need not be independent.
(The theorem is stated in terms of CBE; hence, it holds a fortiori for REE as well.) In
words: the asset's payo, normalized by the end-of-period price, must not have a positive
drift.
Theorem 9 covers an important case: equity. The eventual payo on equity (\liquida-
tion value") depends on whether the rm has gone bankrupt or not.
12
Absent bankruptcy,
the eventual payo is correlated with the signals that the market receives about the like-
lihood of bankruptcy. Brown, Goetzmann and Ross [1995] argue that bankruptcy could
explain a host of asset pricing anomalies. Many would object to this claim. When samples
are truncated because of survival (we observe only the return histories of non-bankrupt
rms), it is impossible to forcefully argue in favor of Brown, Goetzmann and Ross' conjec-
ture, even under their (implicit) assumption of REE. We shall discuss how our statistics
can shed light on this debate. To better understand the contribution, however, it is
necessary to rst study what happens if bankruptcy is indeed irrelevant.
The presence of bankruptcy is reected in the conditioning on . If bankruptcy is
irrelevant, the empiricist's conditioning on  is ill advised. Investors do not use the signals
to update their beliefs about whether equity will have a positive payo; signals are only
there to indicate the size of the likely payo. Under REE, we have, of course, that
E[r
t+1
jF
t
_ ] = 0: (21)
(The formal conditioning on  =  is continued, despite its irrelevance.) What about the
modied return, x
+
t+1
? A simple application of Jensen's inequality reveals:
E[x
t+1
jF
t
_ ]
= E[
p
t+1
  p
t
p
t
p
t
p
t+1
jF
t
_ ]
= 1  E[
p
t
p
t+1
jF
t
_ ]
 1 
1
E[
p
t+1
p
t
jF
t
_ ]
= 0:
In short,
E[x
t+1
jF
t
_ ]  0; (22)
as in Theorem 9. In other words, the theorem continues to hold even if the empiricist
falsely assumes that conditioning on  is relevant, i.e., that there is a selection bias.
This fact allows one to investigate the importance of bankrupcty in the pricing of
equity under the maintained assumption of REE. If Eqn. (22) holds, equity prices are set
12
As before, we assume that bankruptcy leads to total loss of value. This assumption is standard in
capital structure theory. For empirical evidence, see Clark and Weinstein [1983].
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rationally, whether there is anything (bankruptcy) to be learned or not. If, in addition,
Eqn. (21) holds, learning is indeed irrelevant, and (22) obtains as a mere consequence of
Jensen's inequality. Alternatively, if Eqn. (21) fails, (22) obtains precisely because agents
are learning rationally about bankruptcy.
Consequently, the tests in this paper provide a means with which to identify the
relevance of bankruptcy in a REE context. It uses rationality of updating in a REE to
generate the identifying information. Absent this economic restriction, there is no way
to distinguish the two cases. For every statistical model of the data which accounts for
potential bankruptcy, there is another one where bankruptcy does not occur and which
is observationally equivalent on strictly positive price paths (i.e., the return histories
for the non-bankrupt rms obey the same law). An example is the Brownian motion
in (19) subject to an absorbing barrier at zero. For strictly positive price histories, it is
observationally equivalent to the model in (20), where the price never hits zero.
13
Nevertheless, the contribution of the present paper goes beyond this: it can shed light
on the nature of price setting even if there is a cross-section of price histories for both
securities that mature in the money and those that expire out of the money. We will
come back to this point in the next section.
In the meanwhile, let us look at Figure 9, which illustrates Theorem 9. It displays
estimated densities (histogram, kernel estimate, normal curve) for the time series average
x
+
for a case that is identical to that of the previous section, with the exception that the
security pays W
T

at maturity (instead of $1) when  = .
14
The mean of the density
(0.0007) is again within one standard error (0.0008) of zero. As a matter of fact, there is
not even a noticeable negative bias (Theorem 9 allows the time series average x
+
to be
negative).
15
In contrast, the time series average of the traditional return (not reported)
was positive in every price path.
Other extensions of the martingale results of this paper are worth exploring. At this
point, it suces to add that no reverse-time equivalent to Theorem 9 obtains, because
the empiricist conditions on future signals to evaluate the likelihood of past returns,
whereas the market conditions on past signals to set prices. This is the same reason
why reverse-time martingale results fail to obtain when the signals are correlated (see
Section 6).
13
It may be worth pointing out here that the survivorship bias in itself does not inhibit estimation.
It is well known, for instance, how to estimate the parameters of a Markov chain with absorbing barrier
(the absorbing barrier being the equivalent of the survival determinant). See, e.g., Basawa and Rao
[1980], p.68.
14
The parameters remained as in Section 5. It can be shown that p
t
=W
t
(instead of Eqn. (18).
15
The upper bound (zero) on the time series average x
+
implied by Theorem 9 is tight if the period-
to-period variability in the expectation of V is low. Details can be found in the proof of the theorem in
the Appendix.
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8 Relevance For Cross-Sectional Analysis
The importance of the results in this paper for the analysis of single time series requires
little discussion. It may not be readily transparent, however, that the same results can be
a valuable tool in the analysis of cross-sections of return histories which are not subject
to any selection bias.
It was shown in Section 5 that martingale dierence behavior continued to obtain in
a more general environment than that of REE, namely, CBE. Intuitively, it was simple
to see why this was: the restrictions followed only because of the rationality of learning
(the use of Bayes' law), and not because of the unbiasedness of initial beliefs in a REE.
Because the results are not aected by biases in initial beliefs, they can be used
to distinguish REE from CBE where priors are biased. Under REE, expected returns
should not be predictable in any cross-section that is not subject to a systematic selection
bias. In that case, the average return observed by the empiricist is the one computed in
Lemma 1 (the absence of sample selection bias is reected in the fact that  is integrated
out). Absent REE, the cross-sectional average of the historical average return will be
nonzero. If, however, REE fails to hold just because initial beliefs were biased, but
agents where otherwise rational (correctly applied the rules of conditional probability),
the other theorems can still be appealed to. For instance, the price histories for assets
that matured in the money will still satisfy Theorem 3: the cross-sectional average of the
historical mean modied return will be zero.
To illustrate this, consider a sampling of Arrow-Debreu price histories from the Iowa
Experimental Markets (IEM): those corresponding to Arrow-Debreu securities that pay
$1 when one of Apple, IBM, Microsoft and the S&P500 has the highest return over a one-
month period, and those corresponding to whether the stock price of Microsoft went up
or down in the same period. Take six months worth of daily closing prices, spanning the
period October 1995{March 1996. In total, one obtains a cross-section of 46 plus 26
time series, of which twelve are for Arrow-Debreu securities that matured in-the-money.
The mean time series average return for the winning Arrow-Debreu securities is
0.1104. With a standard error of 0.0423, this mean is signicantly positive, conrming
Lemma 2. The mean time series average modied return (x
+
) for the winning Arrow-
Debreu securities equals -0.0171, which is insignicant in view of the standard error of
0.0183. Hence, Theorem 3 is veried, conrming the rationality of learning. Across
all histories of winning and loosing markets, however, the mean time series average re-
turn was 0.0488, which is signicantly positive because of a standard error of 0.0249.
16
Consequently, REE is rejected.
16
Actually, the estimate of the standard error is biased upward: it ignores the strong negative cor-
relation between return histories of complementary Arrow-Debreu securities such as the two securities
deriving their value from the price change of Apple stock (one of them necessarily ends up out of the
money; the other will expire in the money).
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9 Open Questions
The main contribution of this paper lies in the martingale restrictions on payo-related
variables for Arrow-Debreu securities and their robustness to extensions of REE to equi-
libria with less controversial beliefs structures. The results rely almost exclusively on the
rationality of belief updating, i.e., on the assumption that investors follow the rules of
conditional probability in processing payo-relevant information. Some remarks are in
order.
Remark 1: It should be emphasized here that the robustness of the martingale re-
sults to initial beliefs is unique in the learning literature. The controversy surrounding
Bayesian statistical analysis, for instance, can mainly be attributed to the sensitivity of
the inference to the specication of priors.
17
In contrast, we have here a set of restrictions
on security price data which are robust to investors' initial beliefs.
Remark 2: We have been assuming risk neutrality and zero discount rates. The
latter can easily be relaxed. But risk aversion could now also be reintroduced. Any
deviation from martingale behavior can then be analyzed as risk premia, in analogy
with the literature on asset pricing under REE in a static, or a stationary, dynamic
environment. This means that the results of this paper provide a starting point to build
tests of standard asset pricing eects in an environment where there is learning, and
where the learning may start from arbitrary beliefs.
Remark 3: About statistical inference. In the illustrations of Sections 6 and 7,
the behavior of the time-series average payo-related variables (such as returns) was
investigated, as well as that of the parameter estimates in time series OLS projections
onto lagged information. The martingale dierence characterization of some of these
variables would suggest that one could appeal to a martingale Central Limit Theorem
(CLT) and use z-statistics and the standard normal distribution for testing in a given
time series.
Martingale CLTs, however, do not readily obtain. For one thing, convergence of beliefs
may make the asymptotic standard deviation of the (scaled) estimated parameters zero.
In the illustrations of the previous section, one could avoid this by increasing the dierence
between T (maturity of the security) and T

(the state is determined by whether W
t
crosses the boundary B before T

> T ) as T ! 1. Even so, the asymptotic standard
deviation may be sample-dependent. In principle, this is not a problem. Martingale
CLTs could be appealed to which allow the asymptotic standard deviation to vary across
sample paths (see, e.g., Hall and Heyde [1980], p. 58).
Unfortunately, extensive simulations along the lines of those reported in the previous
section revealed that either CLTs failed to obtain or the moderately long time series length
was insucient for CLT behavior to kick in. The reason behind the non-normal large-
sample behavior of the z-statistics seems to be the dependence between the parameter's
17
See, e.g., the arguments about Bayesian analysis of nonstationary time series: Sims and Uhlig [1991],
Phillips [1990].
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(scaled) sample value and its estimated standard deviation. Whether this is a small-
sample result or an asymptotic property of the learning environment we are studying
is not clear. In any event, suce it to say that general martingale CLTs do require
the (scaled) parameter estimate to be mean-independent of the asymptotic standard
deviation.
This can easily be illustrated. Figure 10 displays density estimates (histogram, kernel
estimate, normal curve) for the z-statistics computed from the time series average x
+
for an Arrow-Debreu security that paid one dollar if  =  (the true state was ).
The deviation from the standard normal density is not spectacular. Most pronounced,
however, is the bias: the mean equals 0.4181 instead of zero. Less apparent is the lower
standard deviation: 0.8794 instead of 1. Figure 11 plots the (scaled) sample average
against the estimate of its asymptotic standard deviation. The scaled average return
equals:
1
p
T   1
T 1
X
t=1
x
+
t+1
;
whereas the estimate of the asymptotic standard deviation was obtained as the square
root of:
1
T   1
T 1
X
t=1
(x
+
t+1
)
2
:
A signicant negative (linear) relationship appears, which caused the positive bias (rel-
ative to the standard normal) in the z-statistic shown in Figure 10.
The negative relationship is intriguing. A linear, negative relation between scaled av-
erage returns and estimated asymptotic standard deviation has been observed elsewhere.
Bossaerts [1995b] documents this for experimental nancial markets and points out that
the nding invalidates the conclusions regarding market eciency that one usually draws
from the z-statistics.
If the results are an indication of the failure of standard CLTs, the surprisingly reg-
ular, linear relation between the scaled sample average and its asymptotic standard de-
viation, seems to suggest that a simple mixture-of-normals invariance result (nonergodic
martingale CLT) may hold. We leave this question for future research.
18 ;19
To put things into perspective, however, the deviations from standard normality in
Figure 10 should be compared to the dramatic failure of the z-statistic computed from
18
Examples of analytical asymptotics under learning can already be found in Bossaerts [1995a]. In two
particular cases where beliefs ultimately converged, this article derived the asymptotic distribution of
the z-statistic computed from average returns (among other things). In its second case, the asymptotic
value of the scaled average return was negatively correlated with its asymptotic standard deviation,
generating substantial deviations from asymptotic normality. The negative correlation reappears here
(see Figure 11).
19
Phillips [1990] discusses the bimodality of the asymptotic distribution of statistics where the numer-
ator and denominator are correlated. See his p. 56. His paper is particularly relevant for the example
here, because of the presence of innite second moments { see Section 4.
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the time series average return (as opposed to x
+
). Of course, we do not expect a CLT to
hold for this statistic, because returns do not constitute a martingale dierence sequence
(Lemma 2). Figure 12 displays estimates of the density of the z-statistic. Not only is
the nonnormality (skewness) clear, the mean is now as high as 1.9657 and the standard
deviation only 0.3522.
10 Conclusion
This paper proposes modications to the traditional return measure that make it a
martingale dierence sequence (or a reverse-time martingale dierence sequence) when
a key determinant of the payo of an asset remains constant over time and investors
gradually learn about this determinant. The results are not only relevant to time series
analysis subject to selection bias (e.g., survivorship bias). Since the restrictions continue
to hold if investors' initial beliefs are biased, i.e., prices are not set in a REE, but a
CBE, they can be used to test REE against CBE in cross-sections that are free from any
selection bias.
Hitherto, tests of market eciency and asset pricing have exclusively been based on
REE. The appeal of REE as an equilibrium concept should be attributed to its empha-
sizing learning (from signals and prices). CBE shares this emphasis, without requiring
priors to be unbiased at the outset. This paper demonstrates that allowing priors to be
biased does not necessarily lead to a situation where \everything is possible." Robust
restrictions still obtain solely as a result of rationality of learning.
The results of this paper therefore should shed new light on the debate about the
sources of predictability in asset return data. Within REE, all predictability reects
time-varying risk premia. In CBE, predictability partly reveals investors' learning payo
determinants. The martingale dierence results obtained here should allow empiricists
to disentangle the two sources of predictability.
There are other means by which to disentangle Bayesian learning and risk premia,
based on dierences between in-sample and out-of-sample predictability. Bossaerts and
Hillion [1996] prove propositions that provide precise discrimination. Using a cross-
section of stock index return histories from fteen countries, they fail to reject that all
predictability that one can generate using linear prediction models is caused by learning.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
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= 0:
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Proof of Lemma 2
From Eqn. (12),
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From Eqns. (15) and (16), it follows that the last expression equals 1. The result imme-
diately obtains:
E[r
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t
_ ] = E[
p
t+1
p
t
jF
t
_ ]  1
> 0:
Proof of Theorem 3
See Section 5 (Eqns. (10) to (16)).
Proof of Theorem 4
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we can solve for
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as a function of
~

n 1
:
~

n
(d) =
l
n 1
(~s
n 1
j)
~

n 1
(d)
l
n 1
(~s
n 1
j)
~

n 1
(d) + l
n 1
(~s
n 1
j)(1 
~

n 1
(d))
:
Consequently,
p
T n+2
=
~

n 1
(d))
and
p
T n+1
=
~

n
(d))
=
l
n 1
(~s
n 1
j)
~

n 1
(d)
l
n 1
(~s
n 1
j)
~

n 1
(d) + l
n 1
(~s
n 1
j)(1 
~

n 1
(d))
;
i.e.,
p
T n+2
p
T n+1
=
~

n 1
(d)
~

n 1
(d)
l
n 1
(~s
n 1
j)
~

n 1
(d) + l
n 1
(~s
n 1
j)(1 
~

n 1
(d))
l
n 1
(~s
n 1
j)
=
l
n 1
(~s
n 1
j)
~

n 1
(d) + l
n 1
(~s
n 1
j)(1 
~

n 1
(d))
l
n 1
(~s
n 1
j)
:
As mentioned in Section 3, ~s
n 1
is not in the empiricist's information set at time (n 1),
F
 
n 1
; it does not become available until time n. This is important in the evaluation of
the following expectation.
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The results obtains from:
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Proof of Corollary 5
This follows from Theorem 4 by the law of iterated expectations.
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Proof of Theorem 6
From the proof of Theorem 4,
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Proof of Theorem 7
See Section 5, Eqn. (18).
Proof of Theorem 8
We shall prove the extension of Theorem 4 to CBE; the proofs of the extension of the other
results work analogously. Q denotes the measure that the empiricist uses to evaluate the
uncertainty about , signals, and, most importantly,
~

1
. We get (for n > 1):
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The result follows from x
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Proof of Theorem 9
To understand the proof, rst note that we needed to dene V only for  =  (because
the security pays zero in all other states). We can extend V arbitrarily for other .
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We shall take this extension to be such that V has the same (conditional) distribution,
independent of . This implies, in particular:
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We shall need an implication of the law of iterated expectations (and Eqn. (23)):
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This is used to prove the following.
E[
p
t
p
t+1
jF
t
_ ]
=
Z
()
Z
S
t+1
R
R
V g(V js
1
; :::; s
t
)dV
R
R
V g(V js
1
; :::; s
t
; s
t+1
)dV
R

l
t+1
(s
t+1
j)
t
(d)
l
t+1
(s
t+1
j)
l
t+1
(s
t+1
j)ds
t+1
Q

(d
0
)
=
Z
()
Z

Z
S
t+1
R
R
V g(V js
1
; :::; s
t
)dV
R
R
V g(V js
1
; :::; s
t
; s
t+1
)dV
l
t+1
(s
t+1
j)ds
t+1

t
(d)Q

(d
0
)

Z
()
Z

R
R
V g(V js
1
; :::; s
t
)dV
R
S
t+1
(
R
R
V g(V js
1
; :::; s
t
; s
t+1
)dV )l
t+1
(s
t+1
j)ds
t+1

t
(d)Q

(d
0
)
= 1:
33
(The weak inequality in this derivation cannot be made strict, because V may be
independent of s
t+1
, in which case:
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which would imply: E[
p
t
p
t+1
jF
t
_ ] = 1. Also, if the expectation about V changes little
over time, i.e.,
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the inequality will provide a tight bound. This is illustrated in Figure 9.)
The result obtains because x
+
t+1
= 1  p
t
=p
t+1
.
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Figure 1: Typical price path of an Arrow-Debreu security that eventually matures \in-
the-money."
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Figure 2: Histogram, kernel density estimate and Normal curve evaluated at the sample
mean and sample standard deviation, of the time series average return of an Arrow-
Debreu security that matures \in-the-money" (RMEAN). Results based on 200 indepen-
dent time series of length 200 each.
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Figure 3: Histogram, kernel density estimate and Normal curve evaluated at the sample
mean and sample standard deviation, of the time series average payo of an Arrow-
Debreu security that matures \in-the-money" (XMEAN). The payo is normalized by
the end-of-period price. Results based on 200 independent time series of length 200 each.
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Figure 4: Histogram, kernel density estimate and Normal curve evaluated at the sample
mean and sample standard deviation, of the intercept estimate (XB0), in a time series
OLS regression of the payo on an Arrow-Debreu security that matures \in-the-money"
onto its beginning-of-period price. The payo is normalized by the end-of-period price.
Results based on 200 independent time series of length 200 each.
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Figure 5: Histogram, kernel density estimate and Normal curve evaluated at the sample
mean and sample standard deviation, of the slope estimate (XB1), in a time series OLS
regression of the payo on an Arrow-Debreu security that matures \in-the-money" onto
its beginning-of-period price. The payo is normalized by the end-of-period price. Results
based on 200 independent time series of length 200 each.
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Figure 6: Histogram, kernel density estimate and Normal curve evaluated at the sample
mean and sample standard deviation, of the intercept estimate (RB0), in a time series
OLS regression of the return on an Arrow-Debreu security that matures \in-the-money"
onto its beginning-of-period price. Results based on 200 independent time series of length
200 each.
40
- 1 . 5 0 - 0 . 9 0 - 0 . 3 0
R B 1
0
1
2
3
yt
is
n
e
D
Figure 7: Histogram, kernel density estimate and Normal curve evaluated at the sample
mean and sample standard deviation, of the slope estimate (RB1), in a time series OLS
regression of the return on an Arrow-Debreu security that matures \in-the-money" onto
its beginning-of-period price. Results based on 200 independent time series of length 200
each.
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Figure 8: Histogram, kernel density estimate and Normal curve evaluated at the sample
mean and sample standard deviation, of the time series average return of an Arrow-
Debreu security that matures \out-of-the-money" (RMEAN). Results based on 200 in-
dependent time series of length 200 each.
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Figure 9: Histogram, kernel density estimate and Normal curve evaluated at the sample
mean and sample standard deviation, of the time series average payo of a random-
payout Arrow-Debreu security that matures \in-the-money" (XMEAN). The payo is
normalized by the end-of-period price. Results based on 200 independent time series of
length 200 each.
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Figure 10: Histogram, kernel density estimate and Normal curve evaluated at the sample
mean and sample standard deviation, of the z-statistic computed from the time series
average payo of an Arrow-Debreu security that matures \in-the-money" (XT). The
payo is normalized by the end-of-period price. Results based on 200 independent time
series of length 200 each.
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Figure 11: Plot of the scaled time series average payo of an Arrow-Debreu security that
matures \in-the-money," against the estimate of its asymptotic standard deviation (s.d.).
The payo is normalized by the end-of-period price. Results based on 200 independent
time series of length 200 each.
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Figure 12: Histogram, kernel density estimate and Normal curve evaluated at the sample
mean and sample standard deviation, of the z-statistic computed from the time series
average return of an Arrow-Debreu security that matures \in-the-money" (RT) Results
based on 200 independent time series of length 200 each.
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